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OF ONE SHOTTERS AND REPEAT-HITTERS: A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT IN THE EU-US PNR LITIGATION  
Elaine Fahey 
This is a draft of a chapter forthcoming in B. Davies and F. Nicola (eds.) EU Law Stories (Cambridge: CUP, 2015).  
Please consult the book for the final version. 
 
 
Overview 
The EU-US Passenger Name Records (PNR) Agreement litigation (hereafter EU-US PNR),1 remains a 
famously sour memory for many. It is universally depicted in legal scholarship for its delivery of a so-
called ͚PǇƌƌhiĐ͛ victory.2 It is a victory which was secured first and foremost by the European 
Parliament (hereafter EP) as its lead actor to strike down an agreement that was perceived to harbor 
many adverse effects upon the EU ĐitizeŶs͛ data protection rights. It is a sour memory and even 
͚notorious͛ as a decision because the European Court of Justice granted in few words an ostensible 
victory to the EP, albeit a hollow and technical one, i.e. de facto and de jure, on validity grounds 
alone. Furthermore, the litigation is also sour and ͚notorious͛ for its failure to provoke fundamental 
rights analysis from the Court on a highly controversial Agreement that had many repercussions for 
the civil liberties of EU citizens and is even more ͚notorious͛ for its political aftermath, where the 
victory of the EP is perceived as having generated an even worse subsequent agreement than that 
originally entered into with the US.  For an entity (i.e. the EP) that does not litigate frequently, 
                                                           Senior Lecturer in Law, the City Law School, City University London. Email: Elaine.fahey.1@city.ac.uk. For the purposes of this paper, 
the author has interviewed various politicians, lawyers and officials of diverse EU institutions and agencies involved in the litigation and/ or 
currently in political office. Nearly all officials interviewed, past and present, have asked for their identity not to be revealed and the paper 
ƌefeƌs to those iŶdiǀiduals as ͚theǇ͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ iŶ the ŵasĐuliŶe oƌ feŵiŶiŶe aŶd puƌpoƌts to ŵask theiƌ ideŶtitǇ ǁheƌe appropriate. All 
notes are on file with the author. I am grateful to Raluca Sterian and Justin Wong for their assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.  
1 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v Council and Commission, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 30 May 2006, 
[2006] ECR I-4721. On the Agreement and its predecessors: Agreement between the European Community and the United States of 
America on the processing and transfer of PNR data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Bureau 
of Customs and Border Protection ([2004] OJ L 183/ 83, and corrigendum at [2005] OJ L 255/168); Agreement between the European 
Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United 
States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement) OJ 2007 L 204/18; ͚CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ fƌoŵ the CoŵŵissioŶ oŶ the 
Global Approach to Transfers of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data to Thiƌd CouŶtƌies COM ;ϮϬϭϬͿ ϰϵϮ͛; Agreement between the United 
States of America and the European Union on the use and transfer of Passenger Name Record Data to the United States Department of 
Homeland Security of 17 November 2011; OJ L 215/5, 11 August 2012. On the latest proposals for (internal) EU law: CoŵŵissioŶ, ͚Pƌoposal 
For a Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences 
aŶd seƌious Đƌiŵe͛ COM ;ϮϬϭϭͿ ϯϮ; EU-PNR Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment COM (2011) 32 final 
2Derived from the Greek Pyrrikos after a remark attributed by Plutarch to Pyrrhus, who declared, after a great 
victory over the Romans, that another similar victory would ruin him. See G Gilmore and J Rijpma, ͚Annotation of Joined Cases C-317/04 
and C-318/04, EuropeaŶ PaƌliaŵeŶt ǀ. CouŶĐil aŶd CoŵŵissioŶ͛ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 1081, at 1081 ;͚‘jipŵa aŶd 
Gilŵoƌe͛Ϳ; M Mendez, ͚Passenger Name Record agreement - European Court of Justice - Annulment of Commission Adequacy Decision and 
Council Decision Concerning Conclusion of Passenger Name Record Agreement with US Grand Chamber Judgment of 30 May 2006, joined 
cases C-317/04 and C-ϯϭϴ/Ϭϰ, EuƌopeaŶ PaƌliaŵeŶt ǀ. CouŶĐil aŶd CoŵŵissioŶ͛ (2007) 3 European Constitutional Law Review 127. For a 
vast selection of the commentaries available on the case see 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62004CJ0317&lang1=en&type=NOT&ancre= . 
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numerically at least, yet has an increasing fundamental rights mandate, including a foreign affairs 
portfolio, a retrospective on the litigation taken by the EP is easily blind-sided by new powers, 
themes and developments. Nonetheless, the litigation took place at a moment or juncture 
immediately after which the EP gained further foreign affairs powers and further political stature in 
civil liberties. Then more recently then in the recent NSA saga, the EP appeared to be leveraging 
much political weight over civil liberties in transatlantic relations- even on both sides of the Atlantic.  
However, litigation by the EP still remains a rare act in this newer context, largely conducted 
individually and less so collectively. This thus remains an understudied story in scholarship. 
Galanter͛s leading work on litigation and its actors through the deployment of a law and society 
perspective, is used here rather loosely and distantly, as a backdrop for this work to examine the 
practices of the EP as a litigator within the particular context of transatlantic security because of its 
factual and theoretical appeal. According to Galanter, examining US litigation practices over an 
extended time-period, repeat-players (RP) were generally institutions, wealthy ones, with advance 
intelligence and the ability to employ the system so as to become an ͚insider͛. More fundamentally, 
RP had an ability to both manipulate and develop rules. One-shooters (OS), by contrast, tended to be 
individuals with few resources and tended to litigate for immediate outcomes.3 GalaŶteƌ͛s 
theorization arguably provides both a useful and possibly insightful lens through which to 
understand the nature and effects of the judicial process, even outside of the US context and its 
particular actors. It is argued to provide a model of some value for those considering litigation by 
actors in a changing institutional landscape, as both the subjects and objects of that litigation. 
One feature of contemporary transatlantic relations is the place of individual versus collective 
litigation initiated in the public interest. In this regard, public interest is a means to assess the impact 
and relevance of the litigation of the EP. Individual parliamentarians in the EU and one in particular, 
Sophie iŶ͛t ǀeld, the Đhaiƌ of the EP Civil Liberties Committee, has been litigating civil liberties issues 
in transatlantic security agreements with much frequency in the public interest, but not supported 
by the EP en masse in litigation.4 A retrospective analysis of EU-US PNR litigation involves 
appreciating these developments as much as the legal and political context prevailing at the time of 
the litigation. This retrospective focusses upon the EP as a litigator here and the evolving nature of 
the EP͛s foƌeigŶ affaiƌs poǁeƌs. Nonetheless, this account also reflects to some degree at least how 
                                                          
3 GalaŶteƌ also distiŶguished ďetǁeeŶ the ͚speĐial͛ aŶd ͚geŶeƌal͛ effeĐts of litigatioŶ. IŶ this ƌegaƌd, he sought to distiŶguish between the 
effects produced by the impact of litigation, e.g. full-blown effects, attenuated or threatened and the general effects of litigation, including 
its communication and the responses to that information. See M Galanter, ͚WhǇ the haǀes Đoŵe out ahead: SpeĐulatioŶ oŶ the liŵits of 
legal ĐhaŶge͛ 9 (1974) Law & Society Rev 95; M GalaŶteƌ, ͚The DaǇ afteƌ the LitigatioŶ EǆplosioŶ͛ 46 (1986) Md .L. Rev 3, 32. 
4 See E FaheǇ, ͚Law and Governance as checks and balaŶĐes iŶ TƌaŶsatlaŶtiĐ SeĐuƌitǇ͛ 32 (2013) Yearbook of European Law 1-21. See also 
on transatlantic rule-making, E Fahey and D Curtin (eds.), A Transatlantic Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationship 
between the EU and US legal orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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this litigation would be assessed were it to arise in the present circumstances in all of its political and 
legal complexity, as much as its more recent counterparts, involving largely the actions of one 
parliamentarian alone.  
This account develops and re-envisages this story as a retrospective and takes as a starting point in 
Section I the powers of the EP and its (non-)litigious nature as an institutional actor and examines 
what can be achieved through litigation in EU law. In Section II, the account reexamines what the 
Court decided in EU-US PNR and its effects, followed in Section III by the account of the proceedings 
that the author has uncovered through interviewing participants in the litigation, predominantly 
related to or from the perspective of the EP. Section IV reflects upon retelling the story and how it 
might be decided were it to arise today. 
 
SECTION I: THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKDROP TO THE EU-US PNR LITIGATION 
 
(A) The European Parliament and Foreign Affairs: law and practice 
The history of the powers and competences of the EP pursuant to EU law is an evolution of modest 
empowerment steps, expanded gradually, and only sometimes through judicial review. Moreover, 
historically, the EP has used its legislative ͚consent͛ powers as delay powers and such powers have 
evolved through the treaties into more substantive legal powers.5  More recently, its veto power 
generates lesser litigation, least of all as to foreign affairs. It nonetheless generated the most 
significant example of so-called ͚judicial activism͛ on the part of the Court in the infamous Les Verts 
litigation with respect to the contours of locus standi under EU law, which it benefited from by 
means of the subsequently altered wording of what is now Article 263 TFEU.6  Prior to the Treaty of 
Lisbon at least, repeated calls for an enhancement of parliamentary involvement in EU foreign affairs 
had largely ͚fallen on deaf ears͛.7 Any powers of involvement in negotiations for the EU were 
couched in soft law agreements or rules of procedures (for example, so-called Lun 1, Westerterp 
expansion and the Stuttgart Declaration).8 Yet still overall, some such as Thym asserted that the EP 
enjoyed even pre-Lisbon more comparative autonomy than the US Congress.9 Currently, the foreign 
affairs powers of the EP in the treaties may be viewed as modest, largely limited to information and 
                                                          
5 See R Kaƌdasheǀa, ͚The Poǁeƌ to DelaǇ:  The EuƌopeaŶ PaƌliaŵeŶt͚s IŶflueŶĐe iŶ the CoŶsultatioŶ PƌoĐeduƌe͛ 47 (2009) Journal of 
Common Market Studies 385, 399. 
6 Case 294/83 Parti écologiste ͚Les Verts͛ v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339.  See A AleŵaŶŶo ͚What has BeeŶ, aŶd What Could ďe 
ThiƌtǇ Yeats afteƌ Les Veƌts/EuƌopeaŶ PaƌliaŵeŶt: IŶdiǀidual AĐĐess to EU JustiĐe͛ iŶ M Maduƌo aŶd L Azoulai ;eds.Ϳ The Past and Future of 
EU Law – The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) pp. 324-332  
7 D ThǇŵ, ͚Paƌliaŵentary Involvement in European IŶteƌŶatioŶal ‘elatioŶs͛ iŶ M Cremona and B De Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law: 
Constitutional Foundations (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) pp. 201-231. 
8 Ibid, pp. 204-205. 
9 Ibid, p. 210. 
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veto rights only. Such modesty is supplemented by Inter-institutional agreements to take ͚due 
account͛ of their comments during negotiations. Post-Lisbon, the EP has powers of consent to 
approve international agreements in a wide variety of circumstances, pursuant to Article 218(6)(a) 
TFEU.10  And pursuant to the Inter-Institutional Framework Agreement, the Commission shall take 
due account of the Parliament͛s ĐoŵŵeŶts thƌoughout the ŶegotiatioŶs.11 The EP thus possesses a 
right of veto as to international agreements which is linked to information at all stages-pre 
negotiations, ongoing negotiations and final outcome, beyond rights given traditionally in CFSP.12 
 
As regards the critical stage of the opening of negotiations on external relations agreements, 
European Parliament is still excluded: pursuant to Article 218(3) TFEU, the Council shall authorize the 
opening of international relations negotiations, adopt negotiating directives and may authorize the 
signing and conclusion of agreements.  As Eeckhout states, this process excludes the European 
Parliament.13  Similarly, as Schutze states, Council is not primus inter pares with the Parliament but 
instead is primus in relation to the negotiation of international agreements, and is thus executive-
dominant. This state of affairs reflects an uneven constellation of constitutional powers in the EU, 
comprising the mutating executive, ͚front and back stage͛ executives, many agencies and actors in 
the shadows.14 As Advocate General Sharpston has stated in her recent Opinion in the In͛t veld 
decision, the EU͛s eǆeĐutiǀe spaŶs suĐh a ǀast aƌƌaǇ of fields, pƌaĐtiĐes, poliĐies aŶd aƌeas.15 
Nonetheless, the extensive external relations powers of executive actors post-Lisbon contrasts still 
strikingly with those of the EP.  
More specifically as to EU-US, the European Parliament has been regularly participating in a 
Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue with the US. However, the extent of the impact and legal effects of 
this soft diplomacy remain to be seen in contemporary times, in the era of the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership and the NSA Surveillance saga.16 Some suggest that there are limits to 
the PaƌliaŵeŶt͛s eŵpoǁeƌŵeŶt iŶ foƌeigŶ affaiƌs, ƌelǇiŶg upoŶ the aĐĐeptaŶĐe ďǇ the PaƌliaŵeŶt of 
the latest EU-U.S. Passenger Name Records Agreement despite its shortcomings in the area of civil 
                                                          
10 See Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) art. 218(6)(a)(v). 
11 See Framework Agreement on Relations between the European Parliament and Commission, Annex III. 
12 See Thym, above n 7. 
13 See P Eeckhout External Relations of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 199. 
14 See D CuƌtiŶ, ͚OffiĐial SeĐƌets aŶd the NegotiatioŶ of IŶteƌŶatioŶal AgƌeeŵeŶts: is the EU EǆeĐutiǀe UŶďouŶd?͛ ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ϱϬ Common 
Market Law Review 423; D Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union: Law, Practices and the Living Constitution (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009); D CuƌtiŶ aŶd I Dekkeƌ ͚The European Union from Maastricht to Lisbon: Institutional and Legal unity out of the 
shadoǁs͛ iŶ P Cƌaig aŶd G de BúƌĐa ;eds), The evolution of EU law (2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) pp. 155-186. 
15 See In ͛t ǀeld ǀ. DepartŵeŶt of HoŵelaŶd Security Case No 1:08-cv-0115-RMC, District Judge Collyer presiding (D.C.C, 15 December 
2008); See Case T-529/09 In ͛t ǀeld v. Council, Judgment of the General Court of 4 May 2012 [2012] ECR II-000; Case C-350/12 P, Council v. 
iŶ͛t Veld [2014] ECR I-000, judgment of 3 July 2014.  
16See D Jancic, ͚The European Parliament and EU-US Relations: Revamping Institutional Cooperation?͛ aŶd M Baƌtl aŶd E FaheǇ, ͚A Post 
National marketplace? Negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership in E Fahey and D Curtin (eds), A Transatlantic 
Community of Law: Legal Perspectives on the Relationship between the EU and US legal orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014).  
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liberties.17 Such conclusions warrant some revision in light of the PaƌliaŵeŶt͛s ƌejeĐtioŶ of the TFTP 
(Swift) Agreement and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) on the grounds of 
inadequacy of information rights and, of course, not least its stance in the NSA affair and are not 
explored here, save as to raise the general context.18   
 
(B) The EP as litigator 
More concretely, for the purposes of the present disĐussioŶ, ƌefleĐtiŶg upoŶ the EP͛s role in the PNR 
litigation involves considering its role as a litigator within the history of EU.  From a numerical 
perspective, the European Parliament is not a repeat player or frequent litigator. It takes 
approximately 10 cases a year, according to officials from its Legal Service.19 The advent of co-
decision as the default or ordinary legislative procedure in EU law-making, which places the EP and 
Council as co-litigators, has arguably operated to reduce the incentive for the EP to litigate 
autonomously qua institution. It also operates to complicate analysis as the EP and Council are 
jointly sued in many cases and when one of them is sued it tends to raise the likelihood that the 
other is joined in the proceedings.  Nonetheless, as a very general proposition, the EP is not found as 
a frequent ͚first-place͛ plaiŶtiff oƌ litigator in many proceedings (ie annulment actions). For example, 
between 1985 and 1990, ie shortly after the inception of the Single European Act and the advent of 
gradual legislative empowerment and institutional autonomy, there were only 4 cases initiated by it 
alone.20 Also, the research of the author indicates that the EP is first named plaintiff qua litigator 
(alone) in 14 cases since the Treaty of Lisbon.21 And from the time of the institution of the EU-US 
PNR litigation or shortly before it up until the Treaty of Lisbon, there were approximately 14 cases 
taken by the EP.22 Whatever about the precise calculation of its total impact or effects, it still pales in 
comparison with other institutional actors in terms of litigation.23 
                                                          
17 See A Ripoll Servent and A MacKenzie, ͚The European Parliament as Norm Taker?  EU-US Relations After the SWIFT Agreement͛ 17 
(2012) European Foreign Affairs Review pp. 71-86.  
18 European Parliament, first reading, (EP-PE_TC1-COD(2005)0127), European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2010 on the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (P7_TA(2010)0432). See above Curtin, n 14. 
19 Interviews of the author, notes on file.  
20 On a search of Eur-lex and Curia Dataďases, seaƌĐhiŶg foƌ ͚PaƌliaŵeŶt͛ aloŶe: Case T-42/89 (122)  Parliament v Yorck von Wartenburg 
[1990] ECR II-00025; Case C-377/87  Parliament v Council [Case closed, [1988] ECR 4017]; C-302/87 Parliament v Council ;͚CoŵitologǇ͛Ϳ 
[Case closed, [1988] ECR 5615]; Case 13/83  Parliament v Council ;͚TƌaŶspoƌt͛Ϳ [Case closed, [1985] ECR 1513]. 
21 See Case C-566/08  Parliament v Council Order  (removed from the register [2010] OJ C234/30) ; Case C-130/10  Parliament v Council 
[Case closed] ; Case C-355/10  Parliament v Council; [Case closed, (Judgment of the Grand Chamber), 5 September 2012]; Case C-490/10  
Parliament v Council [Case closed, ECLI:EU:C:2012:525 (Judgment of the Court - Second Chamber), 6 September 2012]; Case C-658/11 
Parliament v Council [Case closed, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 24 June 2014]; C-103/12  Parliament v Council [Case in 
progress]; Case C-402/12 P  Parliament v Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht [Case in progress]; 
Case C-65/13  Parliament v Commission [Case in progress]; Case C-124/13  Parliament v Council [Case in progress]; Case C-317/13  
Parliament v Council [Case in progress];  Case C-540/13  Parliament v Council [Case in progress]; Case C-679/13  Parliament v Council [Case 
in progress, 2014/C 52/56];  Case C-48/14  Parliament v Council [Case in progress 2013/C 102/30]. 
22 Case C-436/03 Parliament v Council (Judgment of 2 May 2006) [2006] ECR I-3733; Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council  (Judgment of 27 
June 2006) [2006] ECR I-5769; Case C-548/03 Parliament v Council (Removed from the register on 16 December 2004); Case C-317/04 
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More importantly, significant contemporary cases on civil liberties and transparency in the EU have 
been litigated by an individual parliamentarian, Sophie iŶ͛t ǀeld MEP, ǁho has not been able to 
muster adequate support for an intervention before the Court of Justice. And her recent attempts to 
individually litigate institutional balance are less than successful or only partially so, but are still high-
profile. This litigation draws attention to the EP͛s litigatioŶ iŶ EU-US PNR and its role qua mass 
assembly as guardian of fundamental rights and transparency or as a watchdog thereof and an 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of ͚oŶe-shotteƌs͛.24   
Briefly, it is worth recalling the types of judicial review mechanism open to the EP as a litigator in EU 
law in the area of foreign affairs, both prior to and after the Treaty of Lisbon changes.  
 
(C) Ex Ante v. Ex Post Judicial Review and EU Foreign Affairs 
The EU-US PNR decision remains a highly prominent example of ex post facto judicial review, where 
ex ante review did not materialize and it is perhaps useful to consider the difference between the 
two forms of procedure, prior to assessing the actual case itself. Any EU institution or Member State 
is entitled to challenge the constitutionality of a draft international agreement prior to its conclusion 
through ex-ante review. Thus such a procedure accords power across a range of institutions- not just 
to the European Parliament- by providing pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU that the European Court 
of Justice can seek an opinion of the Court on legality. The politicians amongst the interviewees of 
the current author outlined below further, indicated the challenge of mustering appropriate 
numbers within the EP so as to seek an Opinion of the Court of Justice. Yet, paradoxically, ex post 
facto litigation by way of the annulment procedure was more viable despite ostensible political 
benefits of ex ante review. Ex ante power to review such agreements gives to the Court of Justice 
powers that many national courts lack in foreign affairs and is rooted in a traditional or conventional 
understanding of the operation of international law, whereby legal certainty precludes such 
challenges contrary to the contracting parties agreement.  The Court has delivered 15 opinions at 
the last count, not all of which may be said to constitute the leading decisions of EU law.25  In the last 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Parliament v Council (Order of 17 March 2005) [2006] ECR I-2457 ; Case C-318/04 Parliament v Commission (Order of 17 March 2005) 
[2006] ECR I-2467 ; Case C-413/04 Parliament v Council (Judgment of 28 November 2006) [2006] ECR I-11221; Case C-403/05 Parliament v 
Commission (Judgment of 23 October 2007) [2007] ECR  I-9045; Case C-133/06 Parliament v Council (Judgment of 6 May 2008) [2008] ECR 
I-3189; Case C-155/07 Parliament v Council (Judgment of 6 November 2008) [2008] ECR I-8103;  Case C-166/07 Parliament v Council 
(Judgment of 3 September 2009) [2009] ECR I-7135; Case C-474/07 Parliament v Commission (Removed from the register on 17 December 
2008); Joined Cases C-512/07 P(R), C-15/08 P(R)), C-15/08 P(R) Ochetto and European Parliament v Donnici [2009] ECR I-00001. 
23 This account does not explore the empirics of this on grounds of space and the limits of the present research question but it on a cursory 
glance of a search of the curia.eu website appear to be self-evident as a proposition. 
24 On one-shotteƌs, see the litigatioŶ of IŶ͛t ǀeld Ŷ ϭϱ aďoǀe. 
25 R Schütze European Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 209. The 15 opinions are: Opinion 1/75 (Local 
Cost Standard), [1975] ECR 1355; Opinion 1/76 (Laying-Up Fund), [1977] ECR 741; Opinion 1/78 (Natural Rubber Agreement), [1979] ECR 
2871; Opinion 1/91 (EEA Draft Agreement), [1991] ECR I-6079; Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention 170), [1993] ECR I-1061; Opinion 1/92 (EFTA 
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decade there were 2 opinions in 2000, 1 in 2003, 1 in 2008 and 1 in 2009 and so the period under 
discussion of the EU-US PNR Agreement represent perhaps a distiŶĐtiǀe ͚lapse͛ iŶ this tiŵe peƌiod.26 
Looking more broadly as its use since the 1970s, its use often coincides with major Treaty changes. 
However, the practical results between either procedure may not necessarily be so vast, yet warrant 
analysis further below, after the details of the EU-US PNR decision are considered. There, political 
tuƌŵoil ƌesulted fƌoŵ the EP͛s ƌeƋuest foƌ ex ante review being rendered moot by an agreement 
reached. 
Thus substantively, the paper next turns to consider the legal backdrop to the PNR litigation, by 
providing a concise overview of legal mechanisms through which the case arose and its findings.  
 
SECTION II: THE EU-US PNR DECISION OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
Controversy and high politics undoubtedly taints EU-US PNR in its law and politics and the decision 
arguably stands as a reminder of the uncomfortable- and often intractable- nexus between the two. 
It remains of political and legal relevance that the EU-US PNR has its origins in US legislation passed 
in the wake of the 9/11 atrocities, requiring airline carriers to provide US authorities with passenger 
data under threat of sanction. Thus the US Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 required 
all airlines flying into the US to supply PNR data to the US Customs and Border Control (CBP), 
operating within the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Such an obligation did not appear 
compatible with EU law as it then was, given that Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive 
provided that personal information originating from within EU Member States may be transferred to 
a third country only if that country ͚ensures an adequate level of protection,͛27 a level of protection 
which had not formally been established between the EU and US. Thus in December 2003, the EU 
launched negotiations with the US on an Agreement concerning the transfer of PNR data and a draft 
Agreement was reached in 2004. Thereafter, undertakings as to the use of the PNR data were given 
by the US CBP, the US Agency receiving PNR data transferred.28 The Commission meanwhile adopted 
an Adequacy Decision, amounting to a formal finding that, for the purposes of Article 26(5) of the 
Directive, the undertakings offered by the CBP provided adequate protection for the data of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Agreement II), [1992] ECR I-2821; Opinion 2/92 (Third Revised OECD Decision), [1995] ECR I-521; Opinion 1/94 (WTO Agreement), [1994] 
ECR I-5267; Opinion 2/94 (Accession to ECHR), [1996] ECR I-1759; Opinion 3/94 (Banana Framework Agreement), [1995] ECR I-4577; 
Opinion 1/00 (European Common Aviation Area), [2002] ECR I-3493; Opinion 2/00 (Cartagena Protocol) [2002] ECR I-9713; Opinion 1/03 
(Lugano Convention), [2006] ECR I-1145; Opinion 1/08 (GATS), ([2009] ECR I-11129); Opinion 1/09 (European Patent Court), [2011] ECR I-
1137. 
26 See Schutze, (n. 25) 209. 
27 Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ 1995 No. L281, 23 November 1995, p 31. 
28 Undertakings of US CBP issued on 11 May 2004, OJ [2004] L 1235/11. 
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passengers flying to or from the United States.29 On 21 April 2004, the European Parliament voted to 
take the European Commission to the Court of Justice over the proposed EU-US deal to exchange 
passenger name records (PNR).30 However, the adoption of a so-Đalled ͚light͛ iŶteƌŶatioŶal 
agreement thereafter operated to render its proceedings for ex ante review, by means of a Council 
decision for an Agreement and Commission adequacy decisions. Thus an Agreement between the EU 
and US was signed between the representative of the EU Presidency and the US DHS and entered 
into force in 2004, but much disquiet remained concerning the impact of the Agreement on 
fundamental rights, even after the issuing of the US undertakings. As the House of Lords European 
Union Committee has stated, there was much uncertainty in Member State Parliaments about the 
legal purpose of the Agreement entered into. The Committee outlined that: 
 
͚[the Agreement] was not intended to authorise the transfer of PNR data by the airlines to 
the US authoƌities… Its puƌpose ǁas to legalise the ͚pulling͛ ďǇ CBP of PN‘ data … if aŶd oŶlǇ 
if this took place in accordance with the Commission Adequacy Decision, and hence in 
accordance with the Undertakings ...͛31 
 
The EP in particular continued to voice its concerns and eventually sought in two sets of proceedings 
initiated in 2004 before the Court of Justice against the Council and Commission the annulment both 
of the Commission Adequacy Decision and of the Council Decision authorising the signature of the 
Agreement.32 The EP was supported by the European Data Protection Supervisor, while the 
Commission and Council in the two sets of proceedings was supported by the UK. The hearing took 
place on 18 October 2005 and Advocate General Léger gave his Opinion on 22 November 2005.  
 
                                                          
29 Adequacy Decision of 14 May 2004. See House of Lords European Union Committee: The EU/US Passenger Name Records (PNR) 
Agreement (21st Report of Session 2006-07, 5 June 2007), para 38 (House of Lords). See the EP͛s oďjeĐtioŶs to the AdeƋuaĐǇ deĐisioŶs as 
expressed in a resolution: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/mar/EP-PNR-Adequacy31-03-04.pdf  
30 276 voted in favour, 260 against, 13 abstentions to refer the PNR agreement to the ECJ for opinion under ex Article 300(6). Three MEPs 
circulated a letter calling on colleagues to back the recommendation to go to the court. ͚Dear Colleague, Today the European Parliament 
will vote on whether to ask the European Court of Justice to rule on the legality of the EU/US agreement on the transfer of PNR data on air 
travellers to the USA. This step has become necessary to resolve a conflict between Parliament and Commission, which has at its heart 
fundamental questions of privacy and security. The Court will be asked to act as a lawyer would, advising a client who is preparing to sign 
an important contract. The recommendation from the Legal Affairs Committee to refer this matter to the ECJ is neither obstructionist nor 
friǀolous. … the CoŵŵissioŶ aŶd the CouŶĐil haǀe goŶe out of their ǁay to aǀoid effeĐtiǀe parliaŵeŶtary sĐrutiŶy at ďoth the national and 
EuropeaŶ leǀel. … For this reasoŶ ǁe haǀe supported, aŶd iŶǀite you to support, the call by Parliament's JURI committee for recourse to the 
European Court of Justice as a precautionary measure.͛ http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/apr/13ep-vote-pnr-court.htm.  Cf 
subsequently, European Parliament resolution on seeking an opinion from the Court of Justice on the compatibility with the Treaties of the 
EU-US Agreement on the use and transfer of Passenger Name Records to the US Department of Homeland Security (2012/2615(RSP)), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B7-2012-0200&language=EN  . 
31 House of Lords, para. 40 (see n. 29)  
32 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v Council and Commission (Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 30 May 
2006), [2006] ECR I-4721. The Council adopted Decision 2004/496/EC on the basis of ex Article 95 EC in conjunction with ex Article 300(2) 
EC. Commission Decision 2004/535/EC was adopted pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC. 
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Advocate General Léger held that Directive 95/46, could not constitute an appropriate basis for the 
adoption by the Commission of an implementing measure such as a decision on the adequate 
protection of personal data that are subjected to processing operations expressly excluded from its 
scope. Rather, to authorise transfers of such data on the basis of that directive would amount to 
extending its scope in an indirect manner. He held that: 
 
͚It is true that the processing constituted by the collection and recording of air passenger data 
by airlines has, in general, a commercial purpose in so far as it is connected with the operation 
of the flight ďǇ the aiƌ Đaƌƌieƌ. …ŶaŵelǇ the sale of aŶ aeƌoplaŶe tiĐket ǁhiĐh pƌoǀides 
entitlement to a supply of services. However, the data processing which is taken into account 
in the decision on adequacy is quite different in nature, since it covers a stage subsequent to 
the iŶitial ĐolleĐtioŶ of the data. …. 
… In actual fact, the decision on adequacy does not concern a data processing operation 
necessary for a supply of services, but one regarded as necessary to safeguard public security 
and for law-enforcement purposes. That is certainly the purpose of the transfer and the 
processing of PNR data. Consequently, the fact that personal data have been collected in the 
course of a business activity cannot, in my view, justify the application of Directive 95/46, and 
iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ AƌtiĐle Ϯϱ of that diƌeĐtiǀe, iŶ aŶ aƌea eǆĐluded fƌoŵ its sĐope.͛33 
The Court (agreeing with the Advocate General) in its decision given on 30 May 2006 held inter alia 
that ex Article 95 EC (now Article 114 TFEU), as the legal basis of the Council Decision read in 
conjunction with the Data Protection Directive, did not provide an adequate legal basis. The Court 
held that: 
 
͚AƌtiĐle ϵϱ EC, ƌead iŶ ĐoŶjuŶĐtioŶ ǁith AƌtiĐle Ϯϱ of the DiƌeĐtiǀe, ĐaŶŶot justifǇ 
Community competeŶĐe to ĐoŶĐlude the AgƌeeŵeŶt. … The Agreement relates to 
the same transfer of data as the decision on adequacy and therefore to data 
processing operations which, as has been stated above, are excluded from the scope 
of the DiƌeĐtiǀe. …  Consequently, Decision 2004/496 cannot have been validly 
adopted oŶ the ďasis of AƌtiĐle ϵϱ EC. …   That decision must therefore be annulled 
aŶd it is Ŷot ŶeĐessaƌǇ to ĐoŶsideƌ the otheƌ pleas ƌelied upoŶ ďǇ the PaƌliaŵeŶt.͛34  
                                                          
33 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v Council and Commission (Opinion of Advocate-General Leger), [2006] ECR I-
4721 (paras 102-103) 
34 Ibid, para 67-70. 
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It accordingly annulled both Decisions, and concluded that it was unnecessary to consider the 
PaƌliaŵeŶt͛s otheƌ aƌguŵeŶts. GiǀeŶ the ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes of its judgŵeŶt foƌ the EU-US Agreement, 
the Court preserved the effect of the Adequacy Decision until 30 September 2006 to allow time for a 
new Agreement to be negotiated. The First Generation EU-US PNR was thus struck down by the 
Court of Justice solely on legal basis grounds in 2006 and not wider grounds in respect of the 
protection of fundamental rights, despite their analysis by the Advocate General, the parsimonious 
Ŷatuƌe of the Couƌt͛s ƌeasoŶiŶg giǀiŶg susteŶaŶĐe to the ǀieǁ that theiƌ oŵissioŶ aƌose fƌoŵ a 
deeply divided Court.35  Theƌe aƌe, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to DoĐkseǇ, thƌee ͚Đaŵps͛ as to hoǁ to depiĐt aŶd 
analyze the deĐisioŶ, falliŶg ďetǁeeŶ the ͚iŶteƌŶal ŵaƌket͛, ͚fuŶdaŵeŶtal ƌights͛ aŶd ͚data 
pƌoteĐtioŶ͛ sĐhools,36 although one many surmise that there are even more, as the current analysis 
might suggest. Arguably, the latter camp is the most commonplace solely because of the minimal 
reasoning as to the former grounds by the Court. 
 
The specific aftermath of the decision is then worth recalling. A provisional seven-year Agreement 
was then concluded in 2007 to replace the Agreement struck down, which De Witte notes amounted 
to a significantly worse legal bargain for the EU, wherein the US took advantage of the renegotiation 
to extend data retention periods considerably.37 The EP sought to postpone its approval vote on the 
2007 Agreement, deploying its approval powers accorded to it by the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 
218(6)(a) TFEU). The Parliament pressed the Commission for a global strategy on external PNR with 
the US, Canada and Australia which emphasised better redress and effective legal safeguards.38 
Thereafter, negotiation of a revised Agreement followed suit and a ͚Second Generation͛ Agreement 
was agreed in 2011. It has been described by the European Commission as an ͚improved͛ one, 
enhancing data protection mechanisms therein, limiting the use of data, purporting to fight crime 
more effectively, placing obligations on the US to share data with the EU and setting out a detailed 
description for the circumstances when PRN can be used.39 A fuller analysis of its provisions and its 
governance provisions has been conducted by the author elsewhere.40 
                                                          
35 See Rijpma and Gilmore, above n 2. 
36 See C Docksey, ͚The EuƌopeaŶ Couƌt of JustiĐe aŶd the deĐade of suƌǀeillaŶĐe͛ iŶ HijŵaŶs aŶd Hielke ;edsͿ ͚Data pƌoteĐtioŶ aŶŶo ϮϬϭϰ: 
how to restore trust? Contributions in honour of Peter Hustinx, data protection supervisor) Liber Amicorum Peter Hustinx. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2014, Forthcoming). See 
37 See B De Witte, ͚Too ŵuĐh ĐoŶstitutioŶal laǁ iŶ the EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ͚s FoƌeigŶ ‘elatioŶs?͛ iŶ B De Witte aŶd M CƌeŵoŶa ;edsͿ, EU 
Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), p. 11. 
38 Resulting in the Communication from the Commission on the Global Approach to Transfers of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data to 
Third Countries, COM (2010) 492.  
39 European Commission Press Release ͚Neǁ EU-US Agreements on PNR improves data protection and fights Đƌiŵe aŶd teƌƌoƌisŵ͛ 
IP/11/1368 (17 November 2011, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1368_en.htm ). 
40 See Fahey (2013) (n 4). See also the contributions of J Vara, ͚TƌaŶsatlaŶtiĐ CouŶteƌ-Terrorism Cooperation Agreements on the Transfer of 
PeƌsoŶal Data: A Test Foƌ DeŵoĐƌatiĐ AĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ iŶ the EU͛, V Mitsilegas, ͚TƌaŶsatlaŶtiĐ CouŶteƌ-Terrorism Cooperation and European 
Values. The Elusiǀe Quest Foƌ CoheƌeŶĐe͛ and S in͛t Veld, ͚TƌaŶsatlaŶtiĐ ‘elatioŶs aŶd seĐuƌitǇ - Reflections from a Politician, Practitioner 
aŶd Litigatoƌ͛ in Fahey and Curtin (see n 16).  
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The relevance of the place of individuals and officials in the EU-US PNR decision is paramount in a 
retrospective storytale and it is this context to which the account next turns.  Accordingly, the 
context and actual proceedings of the litigation are accounted for, through the insiders perspective.  
 
III. LOOKING BEYOND THE LAW:  KEY FIGURES IN, AROUND AND OF THE EU-US PNR LITIGATION OF 
2004 
(A) The stories 
What follows here is an account of the interviews of the author with key figures of the EU-US PNR 
litigation pertaining to its context and aftermath. On the grounds that many of the interviewees 
were involved in diverse aspects of the negotiation and litigation of the agreement, the interviews 
are not readily separated. Most if not all of the officials have asked for some measure of anonymity 
and so they are not identified here.  
An official interviewed by the author described the role of the President of the EP, Pat Cox MEP, who 
was at the end of the 2004 EP seeking appointment as member of the European Commission, to be 
significant in the offiĐial͛s peƌĐeptioŶ of hoǁ the leadeƌ of the Parliament was seen to be ͚respecting͛ 
and following the position of the European Commission - and thus less so following the line of the 
EP. The official noted that a common ͚joke͛ in legal circles concerning the EU-US PNR litigation was 
Ŷot that it ǁas a ͚pǇƌƌhiĐ ǀiĐtoƌǇ͛ ďut that it ǁas a ͚PǇƌis͛ ǀiĐtoƌǇ, so Đalled afteƌ Jean-Claude Pyris, the 
Head of the Legal Service of the Council and later to be a lead drafter of the Treaty of Lisbon text. 41 
Another official, who did not wish to be identified, described the EU-US PNR litigation as formally 
viewed a victory (but also a ͚pyrrhic͛ one), which was in fact politically useful and in fact even a big 
legal victory for its Parliament and its Legal Service.  They described the views of the Court of Justice 
and Advocate General as disappointing, with split views which provided evidence of much debate in 
the Court. Nonetheless, it was politically useful as a decision because the European Parliament and 
its Legal Service became involved in subsequent agreements and the case became a mere first step 
towards other more significant changes.  They suggested that there was a tendency to overlook 
agreements with Argentina and Japan and their similarities with the US Agreement as a model. They 
also suggested that the EP would increasingly litigate well beyond its 10 cases a year in future times, 
now as joint legislator, but also as individual politicians, representing an increasing number of 
Member States. They said that it was a complicated procedure to get a mandate for litigation in the 
                                                          
41 The official quoted a Congress official, who he had heard stating that there was no real need for PNR data, which was theatrical and 
useless: ͚it ǁas all͛ just gaŵes…͛ 
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first place- never mind to intervene in litigation and it had a policy of not intervening in support of 
the litigation of individual members.  
Another former official, who did not wish to be named, recalled how the hearing of EU-US PNR 
decision was expected to take two days before the Court of Justice, with two cases, one against 
CouŶĐil, otheƌ agaiŶst CoŵŵissioŶ. The offiĐial desĐƌiďed the heaƌiŶg as ͚teƌƌiďle͛, ǁheƌeďǇ the 
pleadiŶgs ǁeƌe ͚huƌƌied up͛ aŶd ƌolled iŶto oŶe ŵoƌŶiŶg ďǇ the PƌesideŶt ŵuĐh to the disŵaǇ aŶd 
surprise of many EU institutions, even refusing the second agent of the EP the possibility to speak. 
The official described how the Courtroom of the ECJ was coincidentally full of national superior court 
judges on a visit to the Court of Justice, somewhat skewing the dynamic of the hearing- and possibly 
also explaining the rush by the Court to stop the hearing at lunchtime. They stated that the EP did 
not accept that the PNR decision was a disaster. Their request for an Opinion had become moot and 
the EP legal service appeared to go further than their politiĐal ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀes iŶ ͚stiĐkiŶg͛ to a 
validity hearing.  The EP Legal Service appeared also to take the events as an ͚insult͛. The official 
expressed dismay at their delight with victory of the Court, as a historic finding of invalidity. Their 
request for an Opinion had not halted the negotiations, as it had had no suspensory effect. The 
threat of the US fining airlines had entailed that the negotiations on an Agreement had proceeded 
with expedition. In response to a question as to the nature of the interactions between the 
institutions, the official responses that in retrospect there should have been more interactions 
between the legal services. Moreover, the original negotiator of the 1st agreement from DG Market 
was eventually fired. As to the impact of the judgment, on the day of the judgment a teleconference 
had been scheduled at 5pm with the US as to how to follow up and reopen negotiations so as to 
respect the judgment- which was called off on account of the ͚validity͛ judgment, with the effect that 
there no longer was an agreement to be discussed.  Another former official, who did not wish to be 
named, maintained that the decision harbored particularly bad memories for them, which they 
labelled as oŶe of the ͚stupidest͛ ever taken by the EP and ever accepted by the Court.  
Another interviewee, a former member of the EP, emphasized the political dynamic of the PNR 
context, as explosive and tense, internally within the EU and externally also. One specific feature of 
the time period under analysis of the EU-US PNR decision, i.e. circa 2004-2006, is the constant 
agitation of the Parliament against the status quo and its dissatisfaction on civil liberties grounds 
with the manner in which the US was acting on European soil/ requiring the EU to act. Former MEP 
Johanna Boogerd-Quaak for the Netherlands described her role as LIBE committee rapporteur and 
her efforts via many votes and resolutions to seek an international agreement with the US as an 
ameliorating technique through law. She described the Parliament͛s ͚temporary͛ successful votes 
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ďeiŶg ŵet ǁith a ͚light͛ agƌeeŵeŶt fƌoŵ the US ǁith ϯϵ uŶdeƌtakiŶgs, in a context superseded 
constantly by new events, for example the Madrid bombings. She referred to the new MEPS from 
Central and Eastern European joining in May 2003 and being asked to vote on the resolution against 
the conduct of the US as worse than that experienced during Soviet Times.42 In response to a 
question concerning how high-profile she perceived that her actions at European level might be seen 
in domestic (Dutch) politics, she described it as having had little impact at national level, despite 
being interviewed and cited extensively in international media, for example, the International Herald 
Tribune. As to the perspective of the Commission on the mounting disquiet in the European 
Parliament, she described her interactions with the Dutch Commissioner, who she described as a 
͚sǇŵpathetiĐ͛ ŵeŵďeƌ of the CoŵŵissioŶ ;Fritz Bolkenstein), whose viewpoint was that inevitably 
defeat would result from European opposition to US action, although the latter assertion of 
sympathy was contradicted by another official interviewed, but not an official of her nationality.  
Turning finally to a current member of the EP since 2004, and the last two parliaments, Sophie In͛t 
veld was interviewed by the author extensively as a highly relevant actor in contemporary 
transatlantic relations. IŶ͛t ǀeld ǁas vice-chair of the European Parliament committee for civil 
liberties, justice and home affairs, a member of the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue and was a 
member of the committee investigating the CIA renditions and black sites. She was a member of the 
parliamentary inquiry into mass surveillance by the NSA, and programmes like Prism and Tempora 
and rapporteur for the evaluation of EU counter terrorism policies and for the international 
agreements for the exchange of Passenger Name Records. She has been involved in the discussions 
on the so-called ͚SWIFT͛ agreement on the transfer of bank data,43 as well as the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA) and the current review of the EU Data Protection framework. In addition to 
her parliamentary work, she has pursued some of these matters in court, both in the US and in the 
EU, and also have taken some cases before the European Ombudsman.44 One of her main 
observations on contemporary transatlantic relations was that the EU needed to shape up in the 
Transatlantic relationship. In the area of law enforcement, security and counter terrorism, the 
relationship is very unequal.  A second observation was that the parliamentary dimension of the 
transatlantic cooperation needed to be strengthened urgently. Most transatlantic contacts were 
between civil servants, diplomats and Government officials. According to her, the so-called 
Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue (TLD), a joint committee composed of Members of the European 
                                                          
42 She was no longer in office at the time of that the litigation went to the Court of Justice, given the transition of parliamentarians into the 
new parliamentary term but had impressed upon her successor, Sophie in͛t veld, this portfolio and actively supported her successors work 
and efforts.  
43 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and Transfer of Financial Messaging Data 
from the European Union to the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, OJ 2010 No. L195, 27 July 2010.  
44 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v. Council and Commission [2006] ECR I-4721; T-301/10 IŶ͛t Veld ǀ. EuropeaŶ 
Commission [2013] ECR II-000, judgment of the General Court of 19 March 2013. 
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Parliament and Members of US Congress,  hadŶ͛t worked very well in practice. She summed up the 
state of EU-US Passenger Name Record (PNR) data pithily: after 9 years of negotiations, re-
negotiations and court cases, Parliament ended up in 2012 endorsing an agreement that was worse 
than the one challenged in the Court of Justice in 2004. 
 
Looking forward, In͛t veld referred to the recent and high-profile Data Retention litigation challenge 
as a changing context for EU-US relations. 45 She emphasized how she was battling to challenge the 
strong ͚Sir HuŵphƌeǇ͛ character of the Commission and Council with respect to transparency and 
international relations.  She described the challenges of getting the EP to intervene in litigation:- for 
example, an intervention by the EP in support of her litigation had been ͚thwarted͛ in the ACTA case. 
She described how there was much resistance of Legal Service of the EP to intervention and also 
described the EP as very ͚empty handed͛ iŶ tƌaŶsatlaŶtiĐ seĐuƌitǇ, even after mass-surveillance 
inquiry. 
The account next turns to her litigation in greater detail. 
 
(B) What Sophie Did Next: The Litigation of In’t Veld MEP 
 
What followed after the PNR litigation was further individual litigation, conducted without 
intervention by the European Parliament en masse- i.e. many small-scale efforts to procure freedom 
of information or procure PNR data through administrative rather than wholly judicial procedures, as 
is provided for in the PNR regime. This litigatioŶ has ďeeŶ ĐoŶduĐted ďǇ iŶ͛t Veld MEP. Her story is 
considered here briefly in order to place the EU-US PNR litigation in perspective. Her account is 
argued here to be of relevance to the analysis of the public interest in transatlantic security and the 
͚separation͛ of one-shotters and repeat-hitters. 
 
 IŶ͛ t veld͛s stoƌǇ ďegiŶs ǁith heƌ effoƌts, alďeit unsuccessful, to obtain her own Passenger Name 
Record data under the US Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation through litigation which was 
dismissed for ͚erroneously͛ maintaining that the airlines carriers data and the Department of 
Homeland Security data were equivalent or similar.46  Yet IŶ͛t ǀeld has plaǇed aŶd ĐoŶtiŶues to plaǇ a 
significant role in litigating aspects of other major EU-US security agreements. The SWIFT Agreement 
finally reached in 2009 was vetoed by the European Parliament in 2010, again exercising its powers 
                                                          
45 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others Joined Cases (C-293/12 and C-594/12) [2014] ECR I-000.. 
46 See above n 15. For more on the roles of the respective actors involved in PNR transfer, see Fahey (2013), above n 4. 
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of approval accorded by the Treaty of Lisbon, pursuant to Article 218 TFEU.47 Judicial remedies and 
fears of bulk transfers were reported to be the basis of the concerns warranting the rejection of the 
Agreement.48 A second SWIFT agreement was reached in 2010 and entered into force also in 2010. 
The legal basis of that Agreement is in Articles 87(2)(a) and 88(2) TFEU,49 the former providing for 
competence in police cooperation in the area of the collection, storage, processing, analysis and 
exchange of relevant information and the latter, to regulate the tasks and operation of Europol. 
Also, the new provision of the Treaty of Lisbon protecting the privacy of the personal data of EU 
citizens, Article 16 TFEU, is explicitly invoked in a recital to the Agreement, presumably to enhance 
its appaƌeŶt ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to ƌespeĐtiŶg fuŶdaŵeŶtal ƌights iŶ the AgƌeeŵeŶt. A ƌeƋuest ďǇ MEP iŶ͛t 
veld to disclose a classified Council Service Legal Opinion suggesting that the earlier legal basis of the 
Agreement was flawed50 succeeded in part before the General Court recently, on the basis that the 
public interest did not require its suppression.  Advocate General Sharpston ruled in her favour on 
12 February 2014 in a much more forceful vindication of transparency in the negotiation of 
international agreements by the EU. Thereafter, the Court of Justice delivered a resounding victory 
in her favour later in 2014, weighing in against blanket institutional secrecy in the area of 
international relations.51  
 
Her litigation must surely be regarded as most notable and institutionally unsupported at least 
officially by the wider body politic of the European Parliament. In this regard, her story or her part of 
it must be seen in a broader context, where Passenger Name Records is still under development 
within in the EU legislative process, a context which is considered here next.   
 
SECTION IV: RETELLING THE STORY: HOW MIGHT EU-US PNR BE DECIDED TODAY? 
The success and effectiveness of transatlantic rule-making, specifically the EU-US Passenger Name 
Records (EU-US PNR) Agreements and EU-US Terrorist Financial Tracking Programme (EU-US TFTP) 
Agreements respectively has spurred the EU to engage in ͚replica͛ rule-making inspired by the EU-US 
PNR and EU-US TFTP.52 The recent outbreak of the NSA surveillance saga has operated to place EU 
                                                          
47 See A Ripoll Servent, and A MaĐKeŶzie, ͚The EuƌopeaŶ PaƌliaŵeŶt as Ŷoƌŵ-taker? EU-US relations after the SWIFT AgƌeeŵeŶt͛ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ ϭϳ 
European Foreign Affairs Review 71.  
48 ͚MEPS hail HistoƌiĐ ƌejeĐtioŶ of SWIFT deal,͛ Agence Europe, 13 February 2010. 
49 In conjunction with Article 218(5) TFEU, providing the Council with competence to enter the Agreement. 
50 Which was Articles 82(1)(d) and 87(2)(a) TFEU, the former providing competence for judicial cooperation between the States in criminal 
matters. 
51 See above n 15. 
52 For example, Proposal For a Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, COM (2011) 32 , CoŵŵissioŶ CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ, ͚A European terrorist finance tracking 
system available options,͛ COM ;ϮϬϭϭͿ ϰϮϵ fiŶal, although theiƌ pƌeĐise futuƌe is faƌ fƌoŵ ĐeƌtaiŶ. The DiƌeĐtiǀe ǁas ƌejeĐted ďǇ the 
EuƌopeaŶ PaƌliaŵeŶt iŶ ϮϬϭϯ: ͚MEPs ǀote doǁŶ aiƌ passeŶgeƌ data sĐheŵe͛ EUObserver.com (24 April 2013, < 
http://www.euobserver.com/justice/119926>).  
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citizens fundamental rights and data protection centrally in all rule-making of the EU with the US. It 
also caused the EP to vociferously call into question a range of existing EU-US security agreements, 
i.e. external EU security.53 The NSA surveillance has also re-ignited EU-US negotiations on a data 
protection framework.54 While the EP has voted to suspect all EU-US data transfer agreements on 
foot of its inquiry on mass surveillance by the US, by contrast, the EU-US Justice and Home Affairs 
Ministerial meeting in late 2013 stressed the importance of developing the EU-US negotiations on a 
data protection agreement, referencing the work of the EU-US ad hoc working group on the NSA 
surveillance saga.55 It raises the question as to the role of the EP in either setting or (merely) 
defending the public interest in EU foreign affairs and its effectiveness- and the acceptance by the 
Court of the need for institutional balance in foreign affairs. At this point in time, a complete or final 
analysis remains impossible. Yet one official interviewed described how the recent Advocate General 
Opinion on the Data Retention Directive was extremely strong, arguably unduly opposed to bulk 
retention. They adverted to the question of how the PNR case might be litigated today as one that 
was increasingly interesting to judge.56 Another interviewee emphasized how the Data Retention 
Direction expressly excluded police activity on account of the PNR decision. As a result, they said 
that its impact could in no way be seen as an EU-US ͚PNR II͛.  
But what would litigation of PNR by the EP do in the current context? What benefit could it 
generate? Would the EP be able to procure a victory with substance to it? First and foremost, the EP 
does not per se enjoy any special powers to litigate the ͚governance͛ pƌoǀisioŶs oƌ fuŶĐtioŶiŶg of EU-
US Agreements in security. The likelihood of litigation is small. The governance of such agreements 
has generated many challenges as to the rule of law.57 But their justiciability remains problematic. 
The EP enjoys no special oversight role in the latest PNR agreement and has been attempting to 
procure transparency and information as a collective body but without litigating it. Nonetheless, ex 
ante review of the 2011 PNR agreement was sought by the EP, which again fell into mootness. 
Second, the political gains of such litigation could be minimal, just as EU-US PNR indicates. The 
development of institutional balance in foreign affairs may be an embryonic one, involving many 
competence questions to be evolved ex ante and ex post facto questions as to the negotiations of 
                                                          
53 European Parliament Resolution of 23 October 2013 on the suspension of the TFTP agreement as a result of US National Security Agency 
(NSA) surveillance (2013/2831 (RSP)).  
54 See Joint Press Statement following EU-US Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial Meeting of 18 November 2013, Council of the European 
Union statement 16418/13, 18 November, 2013 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-1010_en.htm) 
55 See ͚Report on the Findings by the EU Co-chairs of the Ad Hoc EU-US WoƌkiŶg Gƌoup oŶ Data PƌoteĐtioŶ͛, Council statement 16987/13, 
Ϯϳ Noǀeŵďeƌ, ϮϬϭϯ aŶd ͚Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Floǁs͛ COM(2013) 846 final. Moreover, there are on-going negotiations on an EU-
US Data Protection Framework Regulation and an EU Data Protection Regulation and the NSA surveillance affair has enhanced the 
controversy surrounding a draft provision of Article 42 of the draft Regulation which would give an EU court authority over surveillance of 
EU citizen data pursuant to a foreign court order or other body: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data 
Protection Regulation) COM(2012) 11 Final. 
56 See above n 45.  
57 See further Elaine Fahey, ͚Law and Governance as Checks and Balances in Transatlantic Security: Rights, Redress and Remedies in EU-US 
Passenger Name Records and the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program͛ ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ϯϮ Yearbook of European Law 1. 
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international agreements. Thirdly, the PNR decision now acts as an increasingly awkward precedents 
for the Court in the era of the NSA surveillance saga and a multiplicity of fundamental rights 
instruments (for example, the Charter of Fundamental Rights). The recent Data Retention decision 
demonstrates that the Court is not afraid to put EU fundamental rights centrally in this context.   
Fourth and finally, the high pƌofile Ŷatuƌe of iŶ͛t Veld͛s ǁoƌk, eǀeŶ if ofteŶ doŶe initially through 
ĐoŶduĐtiŶg ͚loǁ leǀel͛ aĐtioŶ ;e.g. FOI procedures) and then transparency laws, raises the issue as to 
the shifting public interest in transatlantic relations, to be developed by one-shotters in repeat-
hitters clothes, rather than repeat-hitters themselves.  
 
In this regard, this retrospective has engaged only to some extent in the ͚ďiggeƌ piĐtuƌe͛ of 
transatlantic relations, looking beyond small-scale story of the institutional context the actions of the 
EP as litigator. It must be recalled that the US Attorney General has claimed before the European 
Parliament that no human rights violations have ever resulted from transatlantic justice and home 
affairs cooperation.58 By contrast, certain Members of the European Parliament, most audibly IŶ͛t 
Veld,  have claimed that the secrecy surrounding the transmission of data under certain transatlantic 
Agreements makes it virtually impossible to assess their operation, even if couched in an extensive 
network of governance mechanisms.59  These issues are of much significance in considering their 
potential litigation. While it is a gloomy way to conclude, there are reasons to suggest that their 
complexity may never be properly the subject of ex post facto judicial review and that the EU-US 
PNR decision is neither replicable nor likely. 
 
Conclusions  
The formulation of one-shot hitters and repeat-players as to EU-US PNR has some obvious 
resonance to it here as an underexplored story on the evolution of an institutional player in EU law. 
It serves to show how one-shotters and repeat-players may not always be so readily separable or 
may alter depending on the law and politics of the situation. Transatlantic relations agreements in 
security has brought into question the role of individual versus collective litigation and the structures 
of the EP to sustain a particular type of pattern of litigation in the public interest. It arguably 
underscores the complexity of formulating the public interest in EU law as its Area of Freedom, 
                                                          
58 AttoƌŶeǇ GeŶeƌal EƌiĐ Holdeƌ, ‘eŵaƌks to the EuƌopeaŶ PaƌliaŵeŶt͚s Coŵŵittee oŶ Ciǀil Liďeƌties, JustiĐe aŶd Hoŵe Affaiƌs, Đlaiming no 
rights violations had resulted from EU-US legal relations to date (World News, 20 September 2011: 
http://wn.com/European_Parliament_Committee_on_Civil_Liberties,_Justice_and_Home_Affairs. Transcript of the speech can be found 
here: < http://useu.usmission.gov/ag_libe_092011.html>) 
59 See ĐoŵŵeŶts Đited iŶ ͚Teƌƌoƌist data oǀeƌsight taiŶted ďǇ poteŶtial ĐoŶfliĐt of iŶteƌest͛ EUObserver.com (21 December 2012, 
http://euobserver.com/justice/118593 ). 
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Security and Justice deepens in scope and breadth. EU-US PNR may deservedly be a leading case of 
EU law for its place in igniting institutional balance in foreign affairs just as much as any other 
leading case depicted in this volume, not least Les Verts. EU-US PNR generated a process of litigation 
that would see many changes in EU-US security. In this regard, it offers an important story worth 
retelling for understanding responses to the NSA affair and the future of EU-US relations in security.  
